The Impact of Matching Mission Preferences

on Well-being at Work by Zoutenbier, R. (Robin)
TI 2014-036/I 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
The Impact of Matching Mission Preferences 
on Well-being at Work  
 
 
Robin Zoutenbier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Tinbergen Institute, the 
Netherlands.  
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
The Impact of Matching Mission Preferences
on Well-being at Work
Robin Zoutenbiery
March 17, 2014
Abstract
A recent literature in economics assumes that workers di¤er in
their mission preferences. These studies predict a premium on the
matching of mission preferences between a worker and employer. This
paper uses data from the Dutch LISS panel to examine this prediction
for government workers. Results show that government workers whose
political preferences match those of the political parties in o¢ ce are
more satised with the type of work they do as compared to govern-
ment workers whose political preferences do not match. A match of
political preferences has no e¤ect on the job satisfaction of workers
outside the government sector.
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1 Introduction
Many organizations strive for objectives other than prots. Such organiza-
tions are commonly found in the public sector or in the private non-prot
sector. While an entrepreneur in the private non-prot sector chooses her
own objectives, the objectives for the public sector, particularly the govern-
ment sector, are set by politicians. Those employed in the government sector
work to meet these objectives. However, these workers may have their pri-
vate preferences regarding the choice of available objectives to work on. As a
result, the preferences of the politicians in o¢ ce and the private preferences
of a government worker are not necessarily aligned.
Recent studies in economics have formalized this idea and have stressed
the importance of the alignment of mission preferences between an agent and
a principal (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dur and Zoutenbier forthcoming). A
common prediction is that workers enjoy a missionpremium in jobs where
their private mission preferences match the employers mission preferences.
That is, workers enjoy working on objectives that are in line with their private
preferences regarding the available objectives. Closely related is the rich
literature on person-organization t in organizational psychology, that has
emphasized the importance of congruence of values between a worker and
an organization for attraction, retention, and performance (Kristof 1996).
The theory of person-organization t has also been studied in a public sector
context. Studies in public administration have shown that public sector
workers who nd it important to be able to help others, report higher job
satisfaction in jobs that o¤er the opportunity to help others (Bright 2008,
Steijn 2008, Taylor 2008, and Wright and Pandey 2008).
This paper uses survey data on Dutch workers to test whether there ex-
ists a premium on the matching of mission preferences within the government
sector. More specically, I examine whether government workers are more
satised with their job if their private mission preferences are better aligned
with the mission of the government in o¢ ce. While previous studies have
exclusively used cross-sectional data on mission alignmentor value congru-
ence, this paper exploits panel data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies
for the Social sciences (LISS). The sample covers a period from 2008 up to
2011. The detailed questions on respondentsoccupation details, political
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preferences, and individual characteristics o¤er a unique opportunity to ex-
amine the e¤ects of the alignment of mission preferences in the government
sector. A workers mission alignment is proxied by comparing a workers
reported vote in parliamentary elections to the outcome of the formation of
a coalition government after the election. I classify a workers preferences
as a match to those of the government, if a worker voted for one of the po-
litical parties that is in o¢ ce after the election. A workers preferences do
not match when a worker voted for one of the parties that is not in o¢ ce
after the elections. Next, self-reported job satisfaction is used to measure a
workers well-being in a job. Job satisfaction is measured by the question:
"How satised are you with the type of work that you do?" This facet of job
satisfaction relates most closely to a workers satisfaction with work itself
(which is of prime interest given the subject of study). Finally, I restrict the
focus of the analysis to workers who are employed in the government sector
rather than all workers in the public sector. The measure of mission align-
ment used in this paper seems more important for those workers under the
most direct control of the politicians in o¢ ce. In contrast, the measures used
in the previously mentioned studies on person-organization t apply more
widely to all jobs in the public sector.
The results of the empirical analysis are in line with the hypothesis. I nd
clear evidence of a premium in job satisfaction on the matching of mission
preferences in the government sector. Government workers who match on
political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce report signicantly higher
job satisfaction as compared to workers whose preferences do not match. The
estimated di¤erence in reported job satisfaction is :391 points. The size of
this e¤ect is comparable to the e¤ect of half an hour reduction in commuting
time and is even larger than the e¤ect of having to work overtime on a
regular basis. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences is insignicant
for workers employed outside the government sector. Additionally, the results
are robust to including both individual and time xed e¤ects and controlling
for a rich set of individual characteristics (age, education level, and health)
and job characteristics (working hours, income, overtime, irregular hours,
supervising task, commuting time, tenure, and job type).
My results nicely complement the existing empirical studies on person-
organization t. Moreover, studies on job satisfaction in economics have
found that public sector workers report higher job satisfaction as compared to
private sector workers (see for instance Clark and Senik 2006). I nd a similar
result. Government workers report, on average, higher job satisfaction as
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compared to workers employed outside the government sector. Interestingly,
this di¤erence is partly explained by the matching of political preferences.
Only those workers who match on political preferences to the political parties
in o¢ ce enjoy signicantly higher job satisfaction in the government sector.
The estimated e¤ect on job satisfaction is positive but insignicant for a
non-matching worker at :420 points, but is highly signicant and doubles in
size for a matching worker (with an estimated e¤ect of :819 points).
Previous studies have shown that mission motivation is especially impor-
tant for higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier
forthcoming). In contrast to these studies I nd that matching political pref-
erences are particularly important for government workers with intermediate
levels of education. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences is almost
twice as large for government workers in the intermediate education cate-
gories as compared to the full sample of workers. The results for workers in
the lowest or highest education categories are slightly weaker as compared
to the full sample.
In a parliamentary system, such as the Dutch system, a government in
o¢ ce usually consists of a coalition of political parties rather than a single
political party. This implies that even if a workers preferred political party
(as measured by their vote) makes it into government, it is still possible that
this party will form a coalition with political parties that are conicting with
a workers preferences. Using information on a workers reported stance to-
wards individual political parties shows that it is not only important if the
party a worker voted for takes up o¢ ce, but also how a worker rates all of
the political parties in a coalition. Government workers with a more positive
attitude towards all coalition parties report signicantly higher job satisfac-
tion as compared to workers with a more negative stance. A similar e¤ect
is found when assessing the relative di¤erence in a workers stance towards
the coalition parties as compared to a workers stance towards the opposition
parties. Government workers who rate the coalition parties more favorably
than the opposition parties report signicantly higher job satisfaction. The
reverse is found for government workers who rate the coalition parties more
negatively than the opposition parties.
I continue as follows. The next section briey discusses the relevant lit-
erature on job satisfaction. Section 3 describes the data used in testing and
explains the empirical strategy. The results of the empirical analysis are
reported and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related literature
There is a growing literature in economics on peoples subjective well-being
(see Frey and Stutzer 2002 for an extensive discussion on well-being measures
and applications). A main eld of interest in this literature is well-being at
work or job satisfaction. Following the seminal paper by Freeman (1978), a
number of studies have examined the role of job satisfaction as a predictor
of labour market outcomes. These studies have documented strong associ-
ations between job satisfaction and behavior in the workplace, such as job
quits (Akerlof et al. 1988, Clark et al. 1998, and Shields and Ward 2001),
absence rates (Clegg 1983), and counterproductive activities in the workplace
(Mangione and Quinn 1975). A second strand of job satisfaction literature
has examined the determinants of a workers job satisfaction. Job satisfaction
has been explained by a variety of di¤erent individual and job characteristics
such as: a workers age, gender, education, wage and tenure (Hamermesh
1977, Borjas 1979, Clark and Oswald 1996, Clark 1997).
More recently, a number of studies have examined di¤erences in subjec-
tive well-being between public sector and private sector employment (Blanch-
ower and Oswald 1999, Cabral Viera 2005, Diaz-Serrano and Cabral Viera
2005, Demoussis and Giannakopoulos 2007, and Ghinetti 2007). The evi-
dence on a public-private sector di¤erential in subjective well-being is mixed
across countries. However, for most countries a public sector premium is
found for a variety of di¤erent facets of job satisfaction. It is often argued
that this di¤erential in job satisfaction is a result of intrinsic motivation or
high job security in the public sector (see e.g. Luechinger et al. 2006).
Few studies have tried to empirically explain di¤erences in subjective
well-being between public sector and private sector workers. A notable ex-
ception is a study by Luechinger et al. (2008). They nd that di¤erences
between countries in public-private sector life satisfaction di¤erentials1 are
partly explained by cross-country di¤erences in regulatory policies and insti-
tutional constraints for the public sector. Other studies have attributed the
di¤erence in subjective well-being between public sector and private sector
workers to sorting. Heywood et al. (2002) use data on British workers and
nd no evidence of a public sector premium after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity between individuals. This indicates that the positive premium
1A workers job satisfaction is often considered as part of a workers general subjective
well-being or life satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996 and Van Praag et al. 2003).
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found in some studies is mainly the result of sorting. People who tend to re-
port greater subjective well-being are more likely to work in the public sector
(this is conrmed in a study by Luechinger et al. 2010). These results gener-
alize to a number of facets of job satisfaction such as satisfaction with work
itself, pay, and the relation with the boss. Lastly, Clark and Senik (2006) do
nd a signicant premium for public sector workers in Britain and France
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. However,
they do not condition on wages indicating that these rents are (partly) a re-
sult of wage rents in the public sector (although for the French sample this
is less likely). Again, these results generalize to a number of facets of job
satisfaction including satisfaction with work itself.
Closely related to this paper are studies in public administration that
examine how person-organization t relates to job satisfaction using data
on public sector workers. A common nding in this literature is that public
sector workers who rate it important to help others, and in addition, nd that
their job o¤ers the opportunity to help others report higher job satisfaction
as compared to public sector workers who do not nd that their job o¤ers the
opportunity to help others (Bright 2008, Steijn 2008, Taylor 2008, andWright
and Pandey 2008). Additionally, Leisink and Steijn (2009) show that these
workers also report a higher willingness to exert e¤ort.2 This paper di¤ers
from the studies on person-organization t in two ways. First, this paper uses
data on workers from all sectors of the economy, which allows to compare
the found results on government workers to non-government workers. Second,
studies on person-organization t have used only cross sectional variation in
mission matching to determine an e¤ect on job satisfaction whereas this
paper exploits variation within the individual over time.
3 Data and empirical strategy
The data used in this paper come from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for
the Social sciences (LISS), conducted by CentERdata.3 The LISS panel is
2Closely related to this study are a number of (eld and lab) experiments in economics
on mission motivation (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2010, 2012, Fehrler and Kosfeld 2012, Ger-
hards 2012, and Carpenter and Gong 2013). These studies invariably nd that participants
with aligned mission preferences exert more e¤ort in a chosen or real e¤ort experiment as
compared to participants with conicting mission preferences.
3For more information on the LISS panel study see www.lissdata.nl.
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a representative panel for the Dutch population aged 16 and older, covering
roughly 5000 households. Panel participants were selected through random
sampling from the community registers of Statistics Netherlands. The LISS
panel is an unbalanced panel, the rst wave dates back to 2008 and the most
recent wave has been completed in 2012. Panel members are contacted on a
monthly basis to answer questions from a specic survey module. The panel
includes modules on work and schooling, health, political values, and a survey
on a number of demographic characteristics. Each module is administered
only once a year (with exception of the demographic survey) resulting in a
yearly survey data structure.
The key variables of interest from this data set are a workers political
preferences, job satisfaction, and industry of employment. Workerspolitical
preferences, as measured by the question: "For which party did you vote in
the parliamentary elections of [22 November 2006/9 June 2010]?", are used
to construct a variable indicating whether a worker matches on mission pref-
erences to the government in o¢ ce. A worker is considered as a match when
the political party that the worker has voted for in the foregoing elections
has taken up o¢ ce in that specic time period.4 A worker is classied as not
matching when a worker indicated to have voted for a political party that
has not become part of the government in o¢ ce.5
Furthermore, the survey includes a number of statements on facets of job
satisfaction (such as wage, hours, career, atmosphere at work, and type of
work). Respondents were asked to score themselves on a eleven-point scale
ranging from "Not at all satised" to "Fully satised". I use the facet of job
satisfaction that relates most to satisfaction with work itself, measured by
4The Netherlands has a parliamentary political system with proportional representation
in the house of representatives. In a parliamentary system, political parties that have a
(coalition) majority in the house of representatives are able to take o¢ ce as a government.
Such a majority is su¢ cient to implement policies. Political parties in o¢ ce after the
elections of November 2006 are CDA (Christian Democrat party), PvdA (Labour party),
and CU (Christian Union party). Political parties in o¢ ce after the elections of June 2010
are VVD (Liberal party) and CDA (Christian Democrat party) with support of the PVV
(Freedom party) in parliament.
5A possible bias would occur if people are dishonest about revealing their vote in the
foregoing parliamentary elections. While it is not possible to observe whether a respondent
reports honestly, respondents were given the opportunity to indicate that they "do not
know" what they had voted or indicate that they "prefer not to say" on which party they
voted. The number of observations in these categories is very low, namely between 1 and
5 percent each year.
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the question: "How satised are you with the type of work that you do?"6
Finally, respondents indicated their sector of employment by answering
the question: "In what sector do you work?" Respondents who answered:
"Government Services, Public Administration and Mandatory Social Insur-
ances" are labelled as a government worker, those who answered di¤erently
are labeled as a non-government worker.7 The focus of the analysis is on
government workers rather than all workers in the public sector. Govern-
ment workers are under most direct control of the government and, therefore,
should benet most when their preferred political party is in o¢ ce.
The sample is restricted to observations from the 2008 to 2011 wave.
The 2012 wave is excluded from the analysis because at the time of data
collection there was no active government in o¢ ce, making it di¢ cult to
dene the matching variable. This restriction leads to a sample of 1714
unique observations for whom there is data on employment details, political
preferences, and a number of demographic variables.
Twomethodical issues arise when trying to estimate the e¤ect of a workers
political preferences on a workers job satisfaction using longitudinal data.
First, a test proposed by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-291)8 shows that the
xed e¤ects model is preferred to the random e¤ects model (p < :01), to
account for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. The second issue
relates to the ordinal nature of the measure of job satisfaction. Several solu-
tions have been put forth to account for endogeneity of individual e¤ects in
models estimating ordinal relationships.9 A drawback of these ordinal xed
e¤ects methods is that the estimated coe¢ cient size is very di¢ cult to in-
6The results of the analysis are similar but slightly weaker when measuring job satis-
faction by the more general question: "How satised are you, all in all, with your current
work?". No signicant e¤ect is found on a workers satisfaction with wages, hours worked,
career, or atmosphere at work.
7Other answer categories include: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Hunting, Mining,
Industrial Production, Utilities, Construction, Retail trade, Catering, Transport, Storage
and Communication, Financial, Business Services, Education, Healthcare and Welfare,
Environmental Services, Culture, Recreation and other services, and Other.
8In contrast to the Hausman test, the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) allows for
clustering of errors at the individual level.
9See for instance Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who suggest to choose a cut-
o¤ point and estimate a xed e¤ect binary logit, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
who allow cut-o¤ points to di¤er over individuals, and Das and Van Soest (1999) or
Baetschmann et al. (2011) who combine estimates for each possible cut-o¤ point made
possible by the data.
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terpret due to the inability to estimate ordinal category thresholds. Given
that the ordinal xed e¤ects methods o¤er no benets in interpretation over
the linear xed e¤ects specication, I use a cardinal scale of job satisfaction
in the estimation. Geishecker and Riedl (2012) show that the assumption
of cardinality still allows to interpret the results in ratios of parameter esti-
mates. A feel for the size of an e¤ect can be obtained by comparisons with
other estimates from the same regression.
The following specication is used in estimation:
JSit= Git+M it+ (GitM it) + x0it + i+ t+"it: (1)
The dependent variable, denoted by JSit, is the job satisfaction of worker i
in time period t. The main variables of interest are a dichotomous variable
Git indicating whether a worker is employed in the government sector or not,
a dichotomous variableMit indicating whether a worker matches on political
preferences to the government in o¢ ce or not, and an interaction between
the government variable and the matching variable. Additionally, I include
time varying control variables xit, individual xed e¤ects i, and time xed
e¤ects  t. Following the hypothesis, I would expect that a match of political
preferences has no e¤ect when a worker is not employed in the government
sector, so  = 0. Whereas for workers employed in the government sector a
match of political preferences should have a positive e¤ect + > 0, because
such a worker can work on policy measures that are in line with a workers
private preferences regarding such a policy.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample including a short
description of each variable used in estimation. Average job satisfaction in
the sample is around 7.7 on a scale to 10. Roughly 13 percent of all workers
are employed in the government sector, corresponding to 131 to 189 obser-
vations each year. The fraction of workers that voted for a political party
that has become part of the government in o¢ ce varies between 44 and 47
percent each year. Figure 1 shows that the di¤erence in job satisfaction be-
tween government workers and non-government workers is relatively small
over the observation period. Looking closer at the job satisfaction of govern-
ment workers over time in Figure 2, I nd that job satisfaction of matching
government workers is slightly higher as compared to non-matching govern-
ment workers in each observation year (although only signicant in 2008 and
2010). Additionally, Table 2 shows the distribution of reported votes over
political parties. Almost 75 percent of all workers voted for one of the four
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larger political parties. The remaining 25 percent of workers indicated to
have voted for one of the many smaller parties. The di¤erences in voting
between government and non-government workers are small. There are a few
exceptions, for instance, government workers are more likely to vote Labor
party or Christian Union and less likely to vote Christian Democrats party,
Socialist party, or Green party.10
4 Results
Table 3 shows the results of the linear xed e¤ects estimation using the
full sample of workers. The size of the coe¢ cient estimates should be inter-
preted with some caution due to the ordinal nature of the response variable.11
The reported standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account
for correlation of errors over time within the individual. The rst estima-
tion includes only a dummy indicating whether a worker is employed in the
government sector and a dummy indicating whether a worker matches on
political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce. In line with previous
literature, I nd that workers in the government sector report higher levels
of job satisfaction as compared to workers in other sectors. The di¤erence
in reported job satisfaction is :578 and signicant. The e¤ect of a match of
political preferences for workers in all sectors in the economy is insignicant
and very close to zero (with a point estimate of :001).
The second column of Table 3 additionally includes an interaction be-
tween a workers sector of employment and the variable match. Results show
that government workers with private political preferences that match those
of the political parties in o¢ ce are signicantly more satised with their
10A number of studies have examined the political preferences of government workers.
These studies nd that government workers, as compared to the general population, are
more likely to be left-wing orientated (Rattso and Sorensen 2013), although this does not
always translate into a higher likelihood to vote for left-wing or socialist parties (Knutsen
2001, 2005, and Jensen et al. 2009).
11It is important to note that all of the reported main results are robust to performing the
analysis using an ordinal xed e¤ects method (see table A.1 in Appendix A). This result is
in line with Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004 who nd evidence that the bias of the linear
xed e¤ects estimator is generally small when using ordinal data. The ordinal xed e¤ects
estimator used in comparison is the blow-up and clusterestimator (see Baetschmann et
al. 2011 for an extensive discussion). Geishecker and Riedl (2012) show that this method
performs as well as or better than the other available ordered xed e¤ects methods.
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job as compared to government workers with non-matching political prefer-
ences. The estimated interaction coe¢ cient of government employment with
match is positive and highly signicant. This interaction e¤ect is interpreted
by looking at marginal e¤ects. A match of political preferences for work-
ers within the government sector is associated with signicantly higher job
satisfaction; the estimated e¤ect ( +  ) is :349 with a p-value of :025. In
contrast, a match of political preferences for workers outside the government
sector seems to be of little importance for a workers reported job satisfaction.
The conditional coe¢ cient for match is slightly negative at  :050 but highly
insignicant. These results clearly indicate a premium in job satisfaction on
the matching of political preferences in the government sector.12
Moreover, a number of recent studies in economics have shown that pub-
lic sector workers report signicantly higher levels of job satisfaction as com-
pared to private sector workers (although this result is not robust to con-
trolling for individual xed e¤ects and income, see Heywood et al. 2002). I
nd no signicant e¤ect of government employment for workers who do not
match on political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce. The condi-
tional coe¢ cient is positive at :420 but insignicant. In contrast, becoming a
government worker seems to have a particularly positive e¤ect when a worker
has matching political preferences. The marginal e¤ect has doubled in size
(:819) and is highly signicant (p = :010).
Next, column 3 includes a number of time varying demographic and job
characteristics as control variables. The e¤ect of a match of political pref-
erences for government workers is robust in both sign and signicance; the
e¤ect increases slightly from :349 to :391 and remains highly signicant.13
Likewise, the e¤ect of a match of political preferences for workers outside
the government sector reduces slightly from  :050 to  :042 and remains in-
signicant. Several of the demographic control variables turn out to have a
12Additionally one may wonder whether all workers in the public sector enjoy higher
job satisfaction when their political preferences match to the political parties in o¢ ce.
Robustness analyses show that public sector workers experience a small but highly in-
signicant mission premium. This indicates that the ndings of this paper are indeed
specic to workers employed in the government sector rather than workers from the public
sector as a whole.
13A feel for the size of the estimated e¤ects is found by comparing the estimates for
the key variables to the estimates of the control variables. For instance, the e¤ect of a
match of political preferences for government workers ·(:391) is equivalent to a half an hour
reduction in daily (one way) commuting time and is even larger than the e¤ect of having
to work overtime on a regular basis.
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signicant impact on job satisfaction. Older workers are less satised with
their job as compared to younger workers, although this e¤ect is decreasing
as workers grow older. The results do not show a clear e¤ect of education.
The lowest and highest educated workers are more or less equally satised
with their job but the intermediate educated workers are much less satised
(although marginally insignicant p = :102). A workers subjective health
score seems to matter only when the assessed health is very poor. Workers
with at least moderate levels of health enjoy similar levels of job satisfac-
tion. There are also some remarkable e¤ects of job characteristics on job
satisfaction. For instance, workers who are expected to work overtime and
workers who need to travel long to get to work are signicantly less satis-
ed with their job. On the other hand, a workers reported job satisfaction
increases in the gross monthly income of a worker. Finally, the time xed
e¤ects, which control for unobserved di¤erences between years, are jointly
signicant (p < :01).
Previous research has shown that mission motivation is more important
for higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier
forthcoming). To assess di¤erences between education levels I estimate equa-
tion (1) including all two-way and three-way interactions between the vari-
ables government, match and three education dummies (low education, in-
termediate education, and high education).14 Table 4 reports the marginal
e¤ects for each education category. In contrast to the previous literature I
nd that not the highly educated government workers but the intermediate
educated government workers are a¤ected most by matching mission prefer-
ences. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences for intermediate educated
government workers is :697 and highly signicant. The marginal e¤ect for
low or high educated government workers is smaller and almost of equal size
to the full sample, but insignicant. In line with the main results, a match
of political preferences has no e¤ect on job satisfaction for any education
category of workers employed outside the government sector. The di¤erences
between education levels in the e¤ect of matching political preferences for
government workers is mainly explained by di¤erences in the marginal e¤ect
of government employment for non-matching workers. Table 4 additionally
14The low education category contains all workers who have completed only primary
school or intermediate secondary education, the intermediate education category includes
all workers who have completed higher secondary or intermediate vocational education,
and the high education category includes all workers who have completed higher vocational
or university education.
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shows the marginal e¤ect of government employment for matching and non-
matching workers. Becoming a government worker has the same e¤ect at any
education level for workers with matching political preferences. The marginal
e¤ect ranges from :703 for higher educated government workers to :773 for
lower educated government workers. There are, however, substantial di¤er-
ences across education levels in the e¤ect of becoming a government worker
for workers whose political preferences do not match. The marginal e¤ect
for lower educated workers (:316) and, in particular, higher educated work-
ers (:488) is much larger as compared to the marginal e¤ect for intermediate
educated workers ( :044). As a result, the di¤erences between matching and
non-matching workers are largest in the intermediate education category.
In the Netherlands the government in o¢ ce usually consists of multiple
political parties, also referred to as a coalition government. This implies that
even if a workers preferred political party (as measured by their vote) makes
it into government, it is still possible that this party will form a coalition
with political parties that are conicting with a workers preferences. Ta-
ble 5 shows the reported stance towards individual political parties for both
government and non-government workers.15 There are relatively small di¤er-
ences in reported stance between government and non-government workers.
The most remarkable di¤erences are found for the parties at the far left
and far right. Government workers are signicantly less positive about the
Socialist party and Freedom party as compared to non-government workers.
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis using the information on a
workers stance towards individual political parties. Column 1 shows the
e¤ect of a workers stance towards the largest coalition party on reported
job satisfaction. Government workers who report a more positive stance to-
wards the largest party in a coalition enjoy higher levels of job satisfaction as
compared to workers with a less positive stance. The standardized marginal
e¤ect equals :122 and is marginally signicant. Additionally, the estimation
in column 2 shows that it is far more important whether a workers stance to-
wards all political parties in a coalition is positive. A workers stance towards
the entire coalition is measured by a workers average rating of all individual
coalition parties. Government workers with a more positive stance towards
all coalition parties report signicantly higher levels of job satisfaction as
compared to those with a more negative stance. The marginal e¤ect of a
15A workers opinion of a political party is measured on a ten-point scale using the
question: "What do you think of [party name]?".
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standard deviation increase for government workers equals :162. In line with
the main results, a workers stance towards coalition parties is unimportant
for job satisfaction of workers in other sectors of the economy. These results
are robust to weighting the political parties by their number of seats in par-
liament. The standardized marginal e¤ect reduces slightly from :162 to :154
but remains highly signicant.
Next, column 4 of Table 6 reports the results using information on the rel-
ative di¤erence between a workers reported stance towards coalition parties
and opposition parties. The results are very much in line with the previ-
ous columns. Workers in the government sector who have a more positive
stance towards the coalition parties as compared to the opposition parties
enjoy signicantly higher levels of job satisfaction than workers with a more
positive stance towards the opposition parties as compared to the coalition
parties. The marginal e¤ect of a standard deviation increase for government
workers equals :131 and is highly signicant. Column 5 shows that these
results are robust to weighting political parties by their number of seats in
parliament. The standardized marginal e¤ect increases slightly from :131 to
:135: These results indicate that it is not only important whether a workers
rst preference (as measured by their vote) matches to the political parties
in o¢ ce, but also what other parties have joined the coalition government
after the election. A natural explanation is that, in the Netherlands, govern-
ment policy is a result of intensive negotiations by coalition parties on the
policy matters at hand. Therefore, political parties in o¢ ce often have to
compromise when making policy plans.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied how matching mission preferences a¤ect job satisfac-
tion of government workers using a sample of Dutch workers. Results show
that government workers whose mission preferences (as measured by their
vote in parliamentary elections) match those of the political parties in o¢ ce
are more satised with their job as compared to government workers whose
preferences do not match. No similar e¤ect is found for workers employed
outside the government sector. Moreover, my results show that public sector
workers report higher job satisfaction as compared to private sector workers.
This di¤erence is partly explained by matching mission preferences. Only
those workers whose mission preferences match those of the political parties
13
in o¢ ce are signicantly more satised when employed in the government
sector. The results are particularly strong for intermediate educated work-
ers. Furthermore, results show that it is not only important if a workers
preferred party takes up o¢ ce (as measured by their vote), but also how a
worker rates all of the other parties that have taken up o¢ ce.
An interesting addition to this study would be to examine how matching
mission preferences relate to sorting. Theory predicts that workers sort to
organizations they share a mission with (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dur and
Zoutenbier forthcoming). This leads to two interesting implications. First,
employee turnover should be higher following election years with a change
in government as compared to years without a change in government. As
a change in government (and therefore mission) would create an exogenous
shock to workersmission motivation. Second, one would expect an inow of
workers whose mission preferences match those of the government, while the
outow of workers should consist largely of workers whose mission preferences
conict with the mission of the government. Unfortunately it is not possible
to shed light on these issues using the LISS data.
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Tables
Table 1: Description of variables used in regression
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev
Job satisfaction Self-reported job satisfaction on a 0-10 scale. 7.71 1.46
Government Variable indicating 1 if a worker is employed
in the government sector.
0.13 0.34
Match Variable indicating 1 if a worker matches on
political preferences to the political parties in
o¢ ce.
0.46 0.50
Age Age in years. 44.93 10.82
Education level Highest attained level of education (Statistics
Netherlands categories): 1=primary school,
2=intermediate secondary, 3=higher sec-
ondary, 4=intermediate vocational, 5=higher
vocational, and 6=university.
4.08 1.34
Subjective health Self reported health: 1=poor, 2=moderate,
3=good, 4=very good, and 5=excellent.
3.27 0.70
Hours Contracted weekly work hours. 31.77 9.48
Income Gross monthly income in euros. 2819 1651
Overtime Required to work overtime measured by:
1=never, 2=sometimes, and 3=often.
1.94 0.60
Irregular hours Required to work irregular hours measured by:
1=never, 2=sometimes, and 3=often.
1.67 0.76
Supervisor Variable indicating 1 if a worker has supervis-
ing tasks.
0.32 0.47
Commuting time Travel time in minutes. 27.96 21.95
Tenure Years employed by current organization. 12.55 10.82
Job classication Worker classications include: 1=agrarian,
2=blue collar, and 3=white collar.
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Table 2: Distribution of reported votes over political parties
Political party Non-government Government Di¤erence
employment employment
Christian Democrats (CDA) 0.20 0.17 -0.03*
Labor party (PvdA) 0.19 0.25 0.06***
Liberal party (VVD) 0.18 0.18 0.00
Socialist party (SP) 0.16 0.11 -0.05***
Green party (GroenLinks) 0.08 0.06 -0.02**
Freedom party (PVV) 0.06 0.06 0.00
Social-Liberal party (D66) 0.05 0.06 0.01
Christian Union party (CU) 0.04 0.07 0.03***
Animal Welfare party (PvdD) 0.02 0.01 0.01
Christian Reformed party (SGP) 0.01 0.01 0.00
Other 0.01 0.01 0.00
Notes: A workers reported vote is measured by the question: "For which party did
you vote in the parliamentary elections of [date of election]?" *, **, and *** indicate a
signicant di¤erence at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Results of the xed e¤ects estimation on job satisfaction
Dependent variable: Job Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Government 0.578** 0.420 0.325
(0.291) (0.269) (0.280)
Match 0.001 -0.050 -0.042
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Government  Match 0.399** 0.433***
(0.164) (0.165)
Age -0.165
(0.102)
Age2 0.003***
(0.001)
Education level:a
- Intermediate secondary -0.041
(0.276)
- Higher secondary 0.094
(0.280)
- Intermediate vocational -0.415
(0.254)
- Higher vocational -0.049
(0.247)
- University -0.146
(0.295)
Subjective health score:b
- Moderate 0.694
(0.505)
- Good 0.836
(0.512)
- Very good 0.799
(0.512)
- Excellent 0.887*
(0.513)
Work hours -0.010
(0.007)
Log(Income) 0.556***
(0.197)
Overtime:c
- Sometimes -0.120*
(0.065)
- Often -0.252***
(0.089)
Continued on next page
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Table 3 - continued from previous page
Dependent variable: Job Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Irregular hours:c
- Sometimes 0.026
(0.056)
- Often 0.011
(0.110)
Supervisor 0.056
(0.111)
Commuting time -0.014***
(0.005)
Commuting time2 0.000***
(0.000)
Tenure -0.008
(0.008)
Job classication:d
- Blue collar 0.873*
(0.525)
- White collar 1.237***
(0.438)
Individual Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5161 5161 5161
Individuals 1714 1714 1714
Log Likelihood -6012 -6006 -5953
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
aReference category: "Primary education". bReference category: "Poor health".
cReference category: "Never". dReference category: "Agrarian". *, **, and ***
indicate signicance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respec-
tively.
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Table 4: Marginal e¤ects by education level
(1) (2) (3)
Low Intermediate High
Educated Educated Educated
Marginal e¤ect of match:
Non-government employment -0.097 -0.094 0.013
(0.120) (0.085) (0.065)
Government employment 0.360 0.697** 0.228
(0.322) (0.291) (0.223)
Marginal e¤ect of government employment:
Non-matching preferences 0.316 -0.044 0.488
(0.362) (0.376) (0.340)
Matching preferences 0.773** 0.748* 0.703*
(0.394) (0.395) (0.412)
Notes: Marginal e¤ects calculated based on equation (1) with additional two-way and
three-way interactions between the variables match, government and education. The
variable education is recoded into (1) low education: primary school or intermediate
secondary, (2) intermediate education: higher secondary or intermediate vocational,
and (3) high education: higher vocational or university. Delta method standard errors
between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on a two sided test
at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Average reported stance towards individual political parties
Political party Non-government Government Di¤erence
employment employment
Christian Democrats (CDA) 5.20 5.28 0.07
(0.032) (0.078)
Labor party (PvdA) 5.33 5.45 0.12
(0.031) (0.082)
Liberal party (VVD) 5.16 5.10 -0.06
(0.032) (0.080)
Socialist party (SP) 5.36 5.06 -0.30***
(0.033) (0.082)
Green party (GroenLinks) 5.30 5.34 0.04
(0.035) (0.086)
Freedom party (PVV) 2.88 2.51 -0.36***
(0.044) (0.109)
Social-Liberal party (D66) 5.44 5.59 0.15*
(0.032) (0.081)
Christian Union party (CU) 4.48 4.53 0.05
(0.035) (0.089)
Animal Welfare party (PvdD) 3.72 3.68 -0.04
(0.039) (0.098)
Christian Reformed party (SGP) 3.33 3.27 -0.06
(0.035) (0.085)
Notes: A workers opinion is measured on a ten-point scale by the question: "What do
you think of [party name]?" Standard errors between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
a signicant di¤erence in means at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: Average job satisfaction over the observation period by sector
2008 2009 2010 2011
Survey year
Non-government employment Government employment
0
2
4
6
8
10
Notes: Histogram shows the average reported job satisfaction in each year including a 90%
condence interval.
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Figure 2: Average job satisfaction of government workers over the observation
period
2008 2009 2010 2011
Survey year
Non-matching preferences Matching preferences
0
2
4
6
8
10
Notes: Histogram shows the average reported job satisfaction in each year including a 90%
condence interval.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Results of the ordered logit xed e¤ects estimation on job satis-
faction
Dependent variable: Job Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Government 1.195** 0.772 0.793
(0.536) (0.508) (0.536)
Match 0.011 -0.102 -0.073
(0.114) (0.119) (0.118)
Government  Match 0.820** 0.810**
(0.349) (0.357)
Control variables No No Yes
Individual Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -2523 -2517 -2455
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *,
**, and *** indicate signicance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01
levels, respectively.
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